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Abstract. When studying safety properties of (formal) protocol mod-
els, it is customary to view the scheduler as an adversary: an entity
trying to falsify the safety property. We show that in the context of se-
curity protocols, and in particular of anonymizing protocols, this gives
the adversary too much power; for instance, the contents of encrypted
messages and internal computations by the parties should be considered
invisible to the adversary.
We restrict the class of schedulers to a class of admissible schedulers
which better model adversarial behaviour. These admissible schedulers
base their decision solely on the past behaviour of the system that is
visible to the adversary.
Using this, we propose a definition of anonymity: for all admissible sched-
ulers the identity of the users and the observations of the adversary are
independent stochastic variables. We also develop a proof technique for
typical cases that can be used to proof anonymity: a system is anony-
mous if it is possible to ‘exchange’ the behaviour of two users without
the adversary ‘noticing’.
1 Introduction
Systems that include probabilities and nondeterminism are very convenient for
modelling probabilistic (security) protocols. Nondeterminism is highly desirable
feature for modelling implementation freedom, action of the environment, or in-
complete knowledge about the system.
It is often of use to analyze probabilistic properties of such systems as for exam-
ple “in 30% of the cases sending a message is followed by receiving a message” or
“the system terminates successfully with probability at least 0.9”. Probabilistic
anonymity [BP05] is also such a property. In order to be able to consider such
probabilistic properties we must first eliminate the nondeterminism present in
the models. This is usually done by entities called schedulers or adversaries. It
is common in the analysis of probabilistic systems to say that a model with
nondeterminism and probability satisfies a probabilistic property if and only if
it satisfies it no matter in which way the nondeterminism was resolved, i.e., for
all possible schedulers.
On the other hand, in security protocols, adversaries or schedulers are malicious
entities that try to break the security of the protocol. Therefore, allowing just
any scheduler is inadmissible. We show that the well-known Chaum’s Dining
Cryptographers (DC) protocol [Cha88] is not anonymous if we allow for all pos-
sible schedulers. Since the protocol is well-known to be anonymous, this shows
that for the treatment of probabilistic security properties, in particular proba-
bilistic anonymity, the general approach to analyzing probabilistic systems does
not directly fit.
We propose a solution based on restricting the class of all schedulers to a smaller
class of admissible schedulers. Then we say that a probabilistic security property
holds for a given model, if the property holds after resolving the nondeterminism
under all admissible schedulers.
2 Probabilistic Automata
In this section we gather preliminary notions and results related to probabilis-
tic automata [SL94,Seg95]. Some of the formulations we borrow from [Sok05]
and [Che06]. We shall model protocols with probabilistic automata. We start
with a definition of probability distribution.
Definition 2.1 (Probability distribution). A function µ : S → [0, 1] is a dis-
crete probability distribution, or distribution for short, on a set S if
∑
x∈S µ(x) =
1. The set {x ∈ S| µ(x) > 0} is the support of µ and is denoted by supp(µ). By
D(S) we denote the set of all discrete probability distributions on the set S.
We use the simple probabilistic automata [SL94,Seg95], or MDP’s [Bel57] as
models of our probabilistic processes. These models are very similar to the la-
belled transition systems, with the only difference that the target of each tran-
sition is a distribution over states instead of just a single next state.
Definition 2.2 (Probabilistic automaton). A probabilistic automaton is a
triple A = 〈S,A, α〉 where:
– S is a set of states.
– A is a set of actions or action labels.
– α is a transition function α : S → P(A×DS).
A terminating state of A is a state with no outgoing transition, i.e. with α(s) =
∅. We might sometimes also specify an initial state s0 ∈ S of a probabilistic
automaton A. We write s
a
→ µ for (a, µ) ∈ α(s), s ∈ S. Moreover, we write
s
a,µ
 t for s, t ∈ S whenever s
a
→ µ and µ(t)> 0.
We will also need the notion of a fully probabilistic system.
Definition 2.3 (Fully Probabilistic Automaton). A fully probabilistic au-
tomaton is a triple A = 〈S,A, α〉 where:
– S is a set of states.
– A is a set of actions or action labels.
– α is a transition function α : S → D(A× S) + 1.
Here 1 = {∗} denotes termination, i.e., if α(s) = ∗ then s is a terminating state.
It can also be understood as a zero-distribution i.e. α(s)(a, t) = 0 for all a ∈ A
and t ∈ S. By s0 ∈ S we sometimes denote an initial state of A. We write s→µ
for µ = α(s), s ∈ S. Moreover, we write s
a
 t for s, t ∈ S whenever s→µ and
µ(a, t)> 0.
A major difference between the (simple) probabilistic automata and the fully
probabilistic ones is that the former can express nondeterminism. In order to
reason about probabilistic properties of a model with nondeterminism we first
resolve the nondeterminism with help of schedulers or adversaries – this leaves
us with a fully probabilistic model whose probabilistic behaviour we can analyze.
We explain this in the sequel.
Definition 2.4 (Paths). A path of a probabilistic automaton A is a sequence
π = s0
a1,µ1
→ s1
a2,µ2
→ s2 . . .
where si ∈ S, ai ∈ A and si
ai+1,µi+1
 si+1.
A path of a fully probabilistic automaton A is a sequence
π = s0
a1→ s1
a2→ s2 . . .
where again si ∈ S, ai ∈ A and si
ai+1
 si+1.
A path can be finite in which case it ends with a state. A path is complete if it
is either infinite or finite ending in a terminating state. We let last(π) denote the
last state of a finite path π, and for arbitrary path first(π) denotes its first state.
A trace of a path is the sequence of actions in A∗∪A∞ obtained by removing the
states (and the distributions), hence above trace(π) = a1a2 . . .. The length of a
finite path π, denoted by |π| is the number of actions in its trace. Let Paths(A)
denote the set of all paths, Paths≤ω(A) the set of all finite paths, and CPaths(A)
the set of all complete paths of an automaton A.
Paths are ordered by the prefix relation, which we denote by ≤.
Let A be a (fully) probabilistic automaton and let πi for i ≥ 0 be finite paths
of A all starting in the same initial state s0 and such that πi ≤ πj for i ≤ j and
|πi| = i, for all i ≥ 0. Then by π = limi→∞ πi we denote the infinite complete
path with the property that πi ≤ π for all i ≥ 0.
Definition 2.5 (Cone). Let A be a (fully) probabilistic automaton and let
π ∈ Paths≤ω(A) be given. The cone generated by π is the set of paths
Cpi = {π
′ ∈ CPaths(A) | π ≤ π′}.
From now on we fix an initial state. Given a fully probabilistic automaton A
with an initial state s0, we can calculate the probability-value denoted by P(π)
of any finite path π starting in s0 as follows.
P(s0) = 1
P(π
a
→ s) = P(π) · µ(a, s) where last(π)→ µ
Let ΩA = CPaths(A) be the sample space, and let FA be the smallest σ-algebra
generated by the cones. The following proposition (see [Seg95,Sok05]) states that
P induces a unique probability measure on FA.
Proposition 1. Let A be a fully probabilistic automaton and let P denote the
probability-value on paths. There exists a unique probability measure on FA also
denoted by P such that P(Cpi) = P(π) for every finite path π. ⊓⊔
This way we are able to measure the probability of certain events described
by sets of paths in an automaton with no nondeterminism. Since our models
include nondeterminism, we will first resolve it by means of schedulers or ad-
versaries. Before we define adversaries note that we can describe the set of all
sub-probability distributions on a set S by D(S+1). These are functions whose
sum of values on S is not necessarily equal to 1, but it is bounded by 1.
Definition 2.6 (Scheduler). A scheduler for a probabilistic automaton A is a
function
ξ : Paths≤ω(A)→ D(A×D(S) + 1)
satisfying ξ(π)(a, µ)>0 implies last(π)
a
→ µ, for each finite path π. By Sched(A)
we denote the set of all schedulers for A.
Hence, a scheduler according to the previous definition imposes a probability dis-
tribution on the possible non-deterministic transitions in each state. Therefore it
is randomized. It is history dependent since it takes into account the path (his-
tory) and not only the current state. It is partial since it gives a sub-probability
distribution, i.e., it may halt the execution at any time.
Definition 2.7 (Automaton under scheduler). A probabilistic automaton
A = 〈S,A, α〉 together with a scheduler ξ determine a fully probabilistic au-
tomaton
Aξ = 〈Paths
≤ω(A), A, αξ〉.
Its set of states are the finite paths of A, its initial state is the initial state of A
(seen as a path with length 1), its actions are the same as those of A, and its
transition function αξ is defined as follows. For any π ∈ Paths
≤ω(A), we have
αξ(π) ∈ D(A× Paths
≤ω(A)) + 1 as
αξ(π)(a, π
′) =
{
ξ(π)(a, µ) · µ(s) π′ = π
a,µ
→ s
0 otherwise
Given a probabilistic automaton A and a scheduler ξ, we denote by Pξ the prob-
ability measure on sets of complete paths of the fully probabilistic automaton
Aξ, as in Proposition 1. The corresponding σ-algebra generated by cones of finite
paths of Aξ we denote by Ωξ. The elements of Ωξ are measurable sets.
ByΩ we denote the σ-algebra generated by cones of finite paths ofA (without
fixing the scheduler!) and also call its elements measurable sets, without having
a measure in mind. Actually, we will now show that any scheduler ξ ∈ Sched(A)
induces a measure P(ξ) on a certain σ-algebra Ω(ξ) of paths in A such that
Ω ⊆ Ω(ξ). Hence, any element of Ω can be measured by any of these measures
P(ξ). We proceed with the details.
Define a function f : Paths≤ω(Aξ)→ Paths
≤ω(A) by
f(πˆ) = last(πˆ) (1)
for any πˆ ∈ Aξ. The function f is well-defined since states in Aξ are the finite
paths of A. Moreover, we have the following property.
Lemma 1. For any πˆ1, πˆ2 ∈ Paths
≤ω(Aξ) we have
πˆ1 ≤ πˆ2 ⇐⇒ f(πˆ1) ≤ f(πˆ2)
where the order on the left is the prefix order in Paths≤ω(Aξ) and on the right
the prefix order in Paths≤ω(A).
Proof. By the definition of Aξ we have that for π, π′ ∈ Paths
≤ω(A) i.e. states
of Aξ: π
a
 π′ if and only if ξ(π) > 0 and last(π)
a,µ
s in A for some µ and s. In
other words if π
a
→ π′, then π ≤ π′ and |π′| = |π| + 1 i.e. π′ extends π in one
step. Therefore, if we have a path π0
a0→ π1
a1→ π2
a2→ · · · in Aξ , then for all its
states: if i ≤ j, then πi ≤ πj and |πj | = |πi|+(j− i). So if πˆ1, πˆ2 ∈ Paths
≤ω(Aξ)
are such that πˆ1 ≤ πˆ2, then last(πˆ1) is a state in πˆ2 and therefore we at once
get last(πˆ1) ≤ last(πˆ2). For the opposite implication, again from the definition
we notice that if a path πˆ ∈ Paths≤ω(A) contains a state π ∈ Paths≤ω(A),
then it also contains all prefixes of π as states. Hence, if last(πˆ1) ≤ last(πˆ2) for
πˆ1, πˆ2 ∈ Paths
≤ω(Aξ), then last(πˆ1) is a state in πˆ2 and also all its prefixes are.
Since all paths start in the initial state (path), this implies that πˆ1 ≤ πˆ2. ⊓⊔
Corollary 1. The function f defined by (1) is injective. ⊓⊔
By Lemma 1 we can extend the function f to fˆ : CPaths(Aξ)→ CPaths(A)
by
fˆ(πˆ) =
{
f(πˆ) π is finite
limi→infty f(πˆi) πˆi ≤ π, |πˆi| = i
The properties from Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 continue to hold for the extended
function fˆ as well. We will write f for fˆ as well.
Recall that Ωξ denotes the σ-algebra on which the measure Pξ is defined.
We now define a family of subsets Ωξ of CPaths(A) by
Ωξ = {Π ∈ CPaths(A) | f−1(Π) ∈ Ωξ. (2)
The following properties are instances of standard measure-theoretic results.
Lemma 2. The family Ωξ is a σ-algebra on CPaths(A) and by
Pξ(Π) = Pξ(f
−1(Π))
for Π ∈ Ωξ a measure on Ωξ is defined.
Recall that Ω denotes the σ-algebra on complete paths of A generated by the
cones. We show that for any scheduler ξ, Ω ⊆ Ωξ. Hence, the measurable sets
(elements of Ω) are indeed measurable by the measure induced by any scheduler.
Lemma 3. For any scheduler ξ, Ω ⊆ Ωξ.
Proof. Fix a scheduler ξ. Since Ω is generated by the cones it is enough to show
that each cone is in Ωξ. Let Cpi0,A be a cone in CPaths(A) generated by the
finite path π0, i.e.
Cpi0,A = {π ∈ CPaths(A) | π0 ≤ π}.
We have
fˆ−1(Cpi0,A) =
{
∅ π0 6∈ fˆ(CPaths(A))
Cpˆi0,Aξ fˆ(πˆ0) = π0
.
by Lemma 1. Indeed, let π0 = fˆ(πˆ0). Then
fˆ−1(Cpi0,A) = {πˆ ∈ CPaths(Aξ) | fˆ(πˆ) ≥ π0}
= {πˆ ∈ CPaths(Aξ) | fˆ(πˆ) ≥ fˆ(πˆ0)}
(Lem. 1) = {πˆ ∈ CPaths(Aξ) | πˆ ≥ πˆ0}
= Cpˆi0,Aξ
We next define two operations on probabilistic automata used for building com-
posed models out of basic models: parallel composition and restriction. We com-
pose probabilistic automata in parallel in the style of the process algebra ACP.
That is, asynchronously with communication function given by a semigroup
operation on the set of actions. This is the most general way of composing prob-
abilistic automata in parallel (for an overview see [SV04]).
Definition 2.8 (Parallel composition). We fix an action set A and a com-
munication function · on A which is a partial commutative semigroup. Given
two probabilistic automata A1 = 〈S1, A, α1〉 and A2 = 〈S2, A, α2〉 with ac-
tions A, their parallel composition is the probabilistic automaton A1 ‖ A2 =
〈S1 × S2, A, α〉 with states pairs of states of the original automata denoted by
s1 ‖ s2, the same actions, and transition function defined as follows. s1 ‖ s2
a
→ µ
if and only if one of the following holds
1. s1
b
→ µ1 and s2
c
→ µ2 for some actions b and c such that a = b · c and
µ = µ1 · µ2 meaning µ(t1 ‖ t2) = µ1(t1) · µ2(t2).
2. s1
a
→ µ′ where µ′(t1) = µ(t1 ‖ s2) for all states t1 of the first automaton.
3. s2
a
→ µ′ where µ′(t2) = µ(s1 ‖ t2) for all states t2 of the second automaton.
Here, 1. represents a synchronous joint move of both of the automata, and 2. and
3. represent the possibilities of an asynchronous move of each of the automata.
In case s01 and s
0
2 are the initial states of A1 and A2, respectively, then the initial
state of A1 ‖ A2 is s01 ‖ s
0
2.
Often we will use input and output actions like a? and a!, respectively, in the
style of CCS.In such cases we assume that the communication is defined as hand-
shaking a? · a! = τa for τa a special invisible action.
The operation of restriction is needed to prune out some branches of a proba-
bilistic automaton that one need not consider. For example, we will commonly
use restriction to get rid of parts of a probabilistic automaton that still wait on
synchronization.
Definition 2.9 (restriction). Fix a subset I ⊆ A of actions that are in the
restricted set. Given an automaton A = 〈S,A, α〉, the automaton obtained from
A by restricting the actions in I is RI(A) = 〈S,A \ I, α′〉 where the transitions
of α′ are defined as follows: s
a
→ µ in RI(A) if and only if s
a
→ µ in A and a 6∈ I.
We now define bisimilarity - a behaviour equivalence on the states of a proba-
bilistic automaton. For that we first need the notion of relation lifting.
Definition 2.10 (Relation lifting). Let R be an equivalence relation on the
set of states S of a probabilistic automaton A. Then R lifts to a relation ≡R on
the set D(S), as follows:
µ ≡R ν ⇐⇒
∑
s∈C
µ(s) =
∑
s∈C
ν(s)
for any equivalence class C ∈ S/R.
Definition 2.11 (Bisimulation, bisimilarity). Let A = 〈S,A, α〉 be a prob-
abilistic automaton. An equivalence R on its set of states S is a bisimulation if
and only if whenever 〈s, t〉 ∈ R we have
if s
a
→ µs, then there exists µt such that t
a
→ µt and µs ≡R µt.
Two states s, t ∈ S are bisimilar, notation s ∼ t if they are related by some
bisimulation relation R.
Note that bisimilarity ∼ is the largest bisimulation on a given probabilistic au-
tomaton A.
3 Anonymizing Protocols
3.1 Dining cryptographers
The canonical example of an anonymizing protocol is Chaum’s Dining Cryptog-
raphers [Cha88]. In Chaum’s introduction to this protocol, three cryptographers
are sitting down to dine in a restaurant, when the waiter informs them that the
bill has already been paid anonymously. They wonder whether one of them has
paid the bill in advance, or whether the NSA has done so. Respecting each other’s
right to privacy, the carry out the following protocol. Each pair of cryptogra-
phers flips a coin, invisible to the remaining cryptographer. Each cryptographer
then reveals whether or not the two coins he say were equal or unequal. How-
ever, if a cryptographer is paying, he states the opposite. An even number of
“equals” now indicates that the NSA is paying; an odd number that one of the
cryptographers is paying.
Formally, Chaum states the result as follows. (Here we are restricting to the
case with 3 cryptographers; Chaum’s version is more general.) Here, F2 is the
field of two elements.
Theorem 3.1 Let K be a uniformly distributed stochastic variable over F32. Let
I be a stochastic variable over F32, taking only values in {(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1),
(0, 0, 0)}. Let A be the stochastic variable over F32 given by A = (I1 + K2 +
K3,K1 + I2 +K3,K1 +K2 + I3). Assume that K and I are independent. Then
∀a ∈ F32 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3} : P[I = i] > 0 =⇒ P[A = a | I = i] =
1
4
and hence
∀a ∈ F32 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3} : P[I = i] > 0 =⇒ P[A = a | I = i] = P[A = a]. ⊓⊔
In terms of the storyline, K represents the coin flips, I represents which
cryptographer (if any) is paying, and A represents the every cryptographer says.
We will now model this protocol as a probabilistic automaton. We will con-
struct it as a parallel composition of seven components: the Master, who decides
who will pay, the three cryptographers Crypti, and the three coins Coini. The
action pi! is used by the Master to indicate to Crypti that he should pay; the
action ni! to indicate that he shouldn’t. If no cryptographer is paying, the NSA
is paying, which is not explicitly modelled here. The coin Coini is shared by
Crypti and Crypti−1 (taking the -1 modulo 3); the action hi,j ! represents Coini
signalling to Cryptj that the coin was heads and similarly ti,j ! signals tails. At
the end, the cryptographers state whether or not the two coins they saw were
equal or not by means of the actions ai! (agree) or di (disagree).
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Now DC is the parallel composition of Master, Coin0, Coin1, Coin2, Crypt0,
Crypt1, and Crypt2 with all actions of the form pi, ni, hi,j , and ti,j hidden.
Note that in Chaum’s version, there is no assumption on the probability
distribution of I; in our version this is modelled by the fact that the Master
makes a non-deterministic choice between the four options. Since we allow prob-
abilistic schedulers, we later recover all possible probability distributions about
who is paying, just as in the original version. Independence between the choice
of the master and the coin flips (I and K in Chaum’s version) comes for free
in the automata model: distinct probabilistic choices are always assumed to be
independent.
In Section 4 we formulate what it means for DC (or more general, for an
anonymity automaton) to be anonymous.
3.2 Voting
At a very high level, a voting protocol can be seen as a blackbox that inputs
the voters’ votes and outputs the result of the vote. For simplicity, assume the
voters vote yes (1) or no (0), do not abstain, and that the numbers of voters is
known. The result then is the number of yes-votes.
v1
//
v2
//
P
i vi
//
vn
//
In such a setting, it is conceivable that an observer has some a-priori knowl-
edge about which voters are more likely to vote yes and which voters are more
likely to vote no. Furthermore, there definitely is a-posteriori knowledge, since
the vote result is made public. For instance, in the degenerate case where all
voters vote the same way, everybody’s vote is revealed. What we expect here
from the voting protocol is not that the adversary has no knowledge about the
votes (since he might already have a-priori knowledge), and also not that the
adversary does not gain any knowledge from observing the protocol (since the
vote result is revealed), but rather that observing the protocol does not augment
the adversary’s knowledge beyond learning the vote result.
For the purely probabilistic case, this notion of anonymity is formalized in
Section 4.
4 Anonymity for Purely Probabilistic Systems
This section defines anonymity systems and proposes a definition for anonymity
in its simplest configuration, i.e., for purely probabilistic systems. Purely proba-
bilistic systems are simpler because there is no need for schedulers. Throughout
the following sections, this definitions will be incrementally modified towards a
more general setting.
Definition 4.1 (Anonymity system). Let M = 〈S,Act, α〉 be a fully proba-
bilistic automaton. An anonymity system is a triple 〈M, I, {Ai}i∈I ,ActO〉 where
1. I is the set of user identities,
2. Ai is any measurable subset of CPaths(M) such that Ai ∩Aj = ∅ for i 6= j.
3. ActO ⊆ Act is the set of observable actions.
4. Otrace(π) is the sequence of elements in ActO obtained by removing form
trace(π) the elements in Act \ActO.
Define O as the set of observations, i.e., O = {trace(π) | π ∈ Paths(M)}. We
also define A =
⋃
i∈I Ai.
Intuitively, the Ais are properties of the executions that the system is meant
to hide. For example, in the case of the dining cryptographers Ai would be
“cryptographer i payed”; in a voting scheme “voter i voted for candidate c”, etc.
Therefore, for the previous examples, the predicate A would be “some of the
cryptographers payed” or “the vote count” respectively.
Next, we propose a definition of anonymity for a purely probabilistic systems.
We deviate from the definition proposed by Bhargava and Palamidessi [BP05] for
what we consider a more intuitive definition: We say that an anonymity system
is anonymous if the probability of seeing a observation is independent of who
performed the anonymous action (Ai), given that some anonymous action took
place (A happened). The formal definition follows.
Definition 4.2 (Anonymity). A system 〈M, I, {Ai}i∈I ,ActO〉 is said to be
anonymous if
∀i ∈ I.∀o ∈ O.P[π ∈ A] > 0 =⇒ P[Otrace(π) = o ∧ π ∈ Ai | π ∈ A] =
P[Otrace(π) = o | π ∈ A]P[π ∈ Ai | π ∈ A].
In the above probabilities, π is drawn from the probability space Paths(M).
The following lemma shows that this definition is equivalent to the one pro-
posed in Bhargava and Palamidessi [BP05].
Lemma 4. A anonymity system is anonymous if and only if
∀i, j ∈ I.∀o ∈ O.(P[π ∈ Ai] > 0 ∧ P[π ∈ Aj ] > 0) =⇒ P[Otrace(π) = o | π ∈ Ai] =
P[Otrace(π) = o | π ∈ Aj ]
Proof. The only if part is trivial. For the if part we have
P[Otrace(π) = o | π ∈ A]P[π ∈ Ai | π ∈ A]
= P[π ∈ Ai | π ∈ A]
∑
j∈I
P[Otrace(π) = o | π ∈ Aj ∩ A] P[π ∈ Aj | π ∈ A]
(since Ai ∩ Aj = ∅, i 6= j)
= P[π ∈ Ai | π ∈ A]
∑
j∈I
P[Otrace(π) = o | π ∈ Aj ] P[π ∈ Aj | π ∈ A]
(by definition of π ∈ A)
= P[π ∈ Ai | π ∈ A] P[Otrace(π) = o | π ∈ Ai]
∑
j∈I
P[π ∈ Aj | π ∈ A]
(by hypothesis)
= P[π ∈ Ai | π ∈ A] P[Otrace(π) = o | π ∈ Ai]
∑
j∈I P[π ∈ Aj ]
P[π ∈ A]
(since Aj ⊆ A)
= P[π ∈ Ai | π ∈ A] P[Otrace(π) = o | π ∈ Ai]
=
P[π ∈ Ai]
P[π ∈ A]
P[Otrace(π) = o ∧ π ∈ Ai]
P[π ∈ Ai]
= P[Otrace(π) = o ∧ π ∈ Ai | π ∈ A]
(since Ai ⊆ A)
which concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
5 Anonymity for Probabilistic Systems
We now try to extend the notion of anonymity to probabilistic automata that
are not purely probabilistic, but that still contain some non-deterministic tran-
sitions.
One obvious try is to say that M is anonymous if Mξ is anonymous for all
schedulers ξ of M . The following automaton M and scheduler ξ show that this
definition would be problematic.
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Here a1 and a2 are invisible actions; they represent which user performed the
action that was to remain hidden. The actions x1 and x2 are observable. Intu-
itively, because the adversary cannot see the messages a1 and a2, she cannot
learn which user actually performed the hidden action. On the right hand side
Mξ is shown and the branches the scheduler does not take are indicated by
dotted arrows. Now Pξ[a1 | x1] = 1, but Pξ[a1] =
1
2 , showing that with this
particular scheduler Mξ is not anonymous.
Note that this phenomenon can easily occur as a consequence of communica-
tion non-determinism. For instance, consider the following three automata and
their parallel composition in which c? and c! are hidden. In this example the order
of the messages x1 and x2 depends on a race-condition, but a scheduler can make
it depend on whether a1 or a2 was taken. I.e., there exists a scheduler ξ such that
Pξ[x1x2 | a1] = Pξ[x2x1 | a2] = 1 and hence Pξ[x2x1 | a1] = Pξ[x1x2 | a2] = 0.
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In fact, the Dining Cryptographers example from Section 3.1 suffers from exactly
the same problem. The order in which the cryptographers say agreei or disagreei
is determined by the scheduler and it is possible to have a scheduler that makes
the paying cryptographer, if any, go last.
In [BP05], a system M is called anonymous if for all schedulers ζ, ξ, for all
observables o, and for all hidden actions ai, aj such that Pζ [ai] > 0 and Pξ[aj ] >
0, Pζ [o | ai] = Pξ[o | aj ]. This definition, of course, has the same problems as
above; in the Dining Cryptographers example in [BP05] this is solved by fixing
the order in which the the cryptographers say agreei or disagree i. However, also a
non-deterministic choice between two otherwise anonymous systems can become
non-anonymous with this definition. For instance, let P be some anonymous
system. For simplicity, assume that P is fully probabilistic (e.g., the Dining
Cryptographers with a probabilistic master and a fixed scheduler) and let P ′ be
a variant of P in which the visible actions have been renamed (e.g., the actions
agreei and disagreei are renamed to equal i and unequal i). Now consider the
probabilistic automaton M which non-deterministically chooses between P and
P ′:
◦
~~}}
}}
}}
}
  A
AA
AA
AA
P P ′
This automaton has only two schedulers: the one that chooses the left branch
and then executes P and the one that chooses the right branch and then executes
P ′. Let’s call these schedulers l and r respectively. Now pick any hidden action
ai and observable o such that Pl[o | ai] > 0. (e.g., o = agree1 disagree2 agree3
and ai = pay1, for which P[o | pay1] =
1
4 ). Then, nevertheless, Pr[o | ai] = 0,
because the observation o cannot occur in P ′. So, even though intuitively this
system should be anonymous, it is not so according to the definition in [BP05].
Every time the problem is that the scheduler has access to information it
shouldn’t have. When one specifies a protocol by giving a probabilistic automa-
ton, an implementation of this protocol has to implement a scheduler as well.
This is especially obvious if the non-determinism originates from communication.
When we identify schedulers with adversaries, as is common, it becomes clear
that the scheduler should not have access to too much information. In the next
section we define a class of schedulers, called admissible schedulers that base
their scheduling behavior on the information an adversary actually has access
to: the observable history of the system.
6 Admissible Schedulers
As explained in the previous section, defining anonymity as a condition that
should hold true for all possible schedulers is problematic. It is usual to quan-
tify over all schedulers when showing theoretical properties of systems with both
probabilities and non-determinism - for example we may say “no matter how the
non-determinism is resolved, the probability of an event X is at least p”. How-
ever, in the analysis of security protocols, for example with respect to anonymity,
we would like to quantify over all possible “realistic” adversaries. These are not
all possible schedulers as in our theoretic considerations since such a realistic
adversary is not able to see all details of the probabilistic automaton under
consideration. Hence, considering that the adversary is any scheduler enables
the adversary to leak information where it normally could not. We call such
schedulers interfering schedulers. This way protocols that are well-known to be
anonymous turn out not to be anonymous. One such example is the dining cryp-
tographers protocol explained above. We show that one gets a better definition
of anonymity if one restricts the power of the schedulers, in a realistic way. In
this section we define the type of schedulers with restricted power that we con-
sider good enough for showing anonymity of certain protocols. We call these
schedulers admissible.
Schedulers with restricted power have been treated in the literature. In gen-
eral, as explained by Segala in [Seg95], a scheduler with restricted power is given
by defining two equivalences, one on the set of finite paths ≡1 and another one
≡2 on the set of possible transition, in this case D(A × S). Then a scheduler ξ
is oblivious relative to 〈≡1,≡2〉 if and only if for any two paths π1, π2 we have
π1 ≡1 π2 =⇒ ξ(π1) ≡2 ξ(π2).
6.1 Admissible schedulers based on bisimulation
In this section we specify ≡1 and ≡2 and obtain a class of oblivious adversaries
that suits the anonymity definition.
Defined ≡1 on the set of finite paths of an automaton M as,
π1 ≡1 π2 ⇐⇒
(
trace(π1) = trace(π2) ∧ last(π1) ∼ last(π2)
)
.
Recall that we defined ≡R as the lifting of the equivalence relation R on a set
S to an equivalence relation on D(A × S). For ≡2 we take the equivalence ≡∼
on D(A× S). This is well defined since bisimilarity is an equivalence. Hence, we
obtain a class of oblivious schedulers relative 〈≡1,≡∼〉. These schedulers we call
admissible.
Definition 6.1 (admissible scheduler). A scheduler is admissible if for any
two finite paths π1 and π2 we have(
trace(π1) = trace(π2) ∧ last(π1) ∼ last(π2)
)
=⇒ ξ(π1) ≡∼ ξ(π2).
Intuitively, the definition of a admissible scheduler enforces that in cases
when the schedular has observed the same history (given by the traces of the
paths) and is in bisimilar states, it must schedule “the same” transitions up to
bisimilarity.
6.2 Existence
We now show that admissible schedulers do exist. In fact, we even show that ad-
missible history-independent schedulers exist. A scheduler ξ is history-independent
if it is completely determined by its image of paths of length 0 i.e. if for any path
π it holds that ξ(π) = ξ(last(π)).
Theorem 6.2 (Existence) There exists a admissible scheduler for every prob-
abilistic automaton.
Proof. Take a probabilistic automatonM . We first show that there exists a map
ξ : S → D(A × S) ∪ {⊥} with the property that ξ(s) = ⊥ if and only if s
terminates and for all s, t ∈ S, if s ∼ t, then ξ(s) ≡∼ ξ(t).
Consider the set of partial maps
Ξ =

ξ : S →֒ D(A× S) ∪ {⊥}
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ξ(s) = ⊥ ⇐⇒ s terminates ,
s ∼ t =⇒ ξ(s) ≡∼ ξ(t)
for s, t ∈ dom(ξ)

 .
This set is not empty since the unique partial map with empty domain belongs
to it. We define an order ≤ on Ξ in a standard way by
ξ1 ≤ ξ2 ⇐⇒
(
dom(ξ1) ⊆ dom(ξ2) ∧ ξ2|dom(ξ1) = ξ1
)
.
Consider a chain (ξi)i∈I in Ξ. Let ξ = ∪i∈Iξi. This means that dom(ξ) =
∪i∈Idom(ξi) and if x ∈ dom(ξ), then ξ(x) = ξi(x) for i ∈ I such that x ∈
dom(ξi). Note that ξ is well-defined since (ξi)i∈I is a chain. Moreover, it is
obvious that ξi ≤ ξ for all i ∈ I. We next check that ξ ∈ Ξ. Let s, t ∈ dom(ξ),
such that s ∼ t. Then s ∈ dom(ξi) and t ∈ dom(ξj) for some i, j ∈ I and either
ξ1 ≤ ξ2 or ξ2 ≤ ξ1. Assume ξ1 ≤ ξ2. Then s, t ∈ dom(ξj) and ξj ∈ Ξ so we
have that ξj(s) ≡∼ ξj(t) showing that ξ(s) ≡∼ ξ(t) and we have established that
ξ ∈ Ξ.
Hence, every ascending chain in Ξ has an upper bound. By the Lemma of
Zorn we conclude that Ξ has a maximal element. Let σ be such a maximal
element in Ξ. We claim that σ is a total map. Assume opposite, i.e., there exists
s ∈ S \ dom(σ). If there exists a t ∈ dom(σ) such that s ∼ t then we define a
new partial scheduler σ′ as follows. If σ(t) = ⊥ we put σ′(s) = ⊥. If σ(t) = µt,
then, since t→ µt and s ∼ t, there exists µs such that s→ µs and µt ≡∼ µs. In
this case we put σ′(s) = µs. Moreover, put σ
′(x) = σ(x) for x ∈ dom(σ). Then
we have σ′ > σ and σ′ ∈ Ξ contradicting the maximality of σ. Hence σ is a total
map.
Finally, we consider the (history-independent) scheduler σˆ induced by σ, i.e.,
defined by σˆ(π) = σ(last(π)) for any finite path π. This scheduler is admissible.
Namely, given π1 and π2 such that trace(π1) = trace(π2) and last(π1) ∼ last(π2)
we have, since σ ∈ Ξ, that
σˆ(π1) = σ(last(π1)) ≡∼ σ(last(π2)) = σˆ(π2)
which completes the proof.
⊓⊔
We are now ready to define anonymity for probabilistic systems, the formal
definition follows.
Definition 6.3 (Anonymity). A system 〈M, I, {Ai}i∈I ,ActO〉 is said to be
anonymous if for all admissible schedulers ξ, for all i ∈ I and for all o ∈ O
Pξ[π ∈ A] > 0 =⇒ Pξ[Otrace(π) = o ∧ π ∈ Ai | π ∈ A] =
Pξ[Otrace(π) = o | π ∈ A]Pξ[π ∈ Ai | π ∈ A].
7 Anonymity Examples
In the purely non-deterministic setting, anonymity of a system is often proved
(or defined) as follows: take two users A and B and a trace in which user A
is “the culprit”. Now find a trace that looks the same to the adversary, but in
which user B is “the culprit” [HO03,GHvRP05,MVdV04,HK07]. In fact, this
new trace is often most easily obtained by switching the behavior of A and B.
In this section, we make this technique explicit for anonymity in our setting,
with mixed probability and non-determinism.
Definition 7.1. Let M be a probabilistic automaton. A map α : S → S is
called an ActO-automorphism if α induces an automorphism of the automation
Mτ , which is a copy of M with all actions not in ActO renamed to τ .
The following result generalized the above-mentioned proof technique that is
commonly used for a purely non-deterministic setting.
Theorem 7.2 Consider an anonymity system (M, I,ActO). Suppose that for
every i, j ∈ I there exists a ActO-automorphism α : S → S such that α(Ai) = Aj.
Then the system is anonymous.
Anonymity of the Dining Cryptographers
We can now apply the techniques from the previous section to the Dining Cryp-
tographers. Concretely, we show that there exists a ActO-automorphism ex-
changing the behaviour of the Crypt1 and Crypt2; by symmetry, the same holds
for the other two combinations.
Consider the endomorphisms of Master and Coin2 indicated in the following
figure. The states in the left copy that are not explicitly mapped (by a dotted
arrow) to a state in the right copy are mapped to themselves.
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Also consider the identity endomorphism on Crypti (for i = 0, 1, 2) and on Coini
(for i = 0, 1). Taking the product of these seven endomorphisms, we obtain an
endomorphism α of DC.
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